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On the coincidence between the Shimomura’s bargaining sets and the core
Abstract
A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets defined by Shimomura
(1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this
aim, a set of payoff vectors, called max-payoff vectors, are introduced. This necessary
condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game.
Resum
En l’article es dona una condicio´ necessa`ria per a que els conjunts de negociacio
definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d’un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible
coincideixin. A tal efecte, s’introdueix el concepte de vectors de ma`xim pagament. La
condicio´ necessa`ria consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.
Keywords: Cooperative games ˙ Core ˙ Bargaining set ˙ Max-payoff vectors
JEL: C71
1 Introduction
An important issue in cooperative games with transferable utility is the problem of dis-
tributing the joint profit obtained by a set of agents. The core of the game consists of
those distributions where each subgroup of agents is at least rewarded according its own
capability to generate profit (that is, according its worth). Allocations outside the core
of the game involve at least a subgroup of players that complain and would like to give
up cooperation. From another perspective, the concept of bargaining set of a cooperative
game refers to distributions where the complaint (or objection) of a subgroup of players
is countered by the complaint (or counterobjection) of another coalition.
In the literature, several definitions of bargaining set have been introduced: the sem-
inal one by Davis and Maschler (1967), the Mas-Colell bargaining set (1989), the Zhou
bargaining set (1994), the reactive bargaining set (Granot, 2010) and the semireactive
bargaining set (Sudho¨lter and Potters, 2001) are among the most relevant. For some
classes of games with a non-empty core, some results on the coincidence between the core
and the bargaining sets have been proved, mainly due to the rich structure of these games.
This is the case of convex games (Shapley, 1971) with respect to the Davis-Maschler bar-
gaining set (see Maschler et al., 1971) and with respect to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
(see Dutta et al., 1989). It is also the case of average monotonic games (Izquierdo and
Rafels, 2001) and of the assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) with respect to
the Davis-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets (see Solymosi, 1999 and 2008,
respectively). Nevertheless, it is rather cumbersome to check whether, for an arbitrary
game, these types of bargaining sets do or do not coincide with the core. Following this,
Solymosi (1999) and Holzman (2001) give a necessary and sufficient condition so that the
core of a game equals its Davis-Maschler bargaining set or its Mas-Colell bargaining set,
respectively. The aim of this paper is to shed light on whether the Zhou bargaining set
(the most unknown in terms of equivalences) coincides with the core, for an arbitrary
game.
Besides the particular requirements on the counterobjecting coalitions, the Zhou bar-
gaining set was originally defined not assuming that all players would finally join the
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grand coalition but allowing players to form subgroups (technically speaking, considering
coalition structures). After Zhou’s definition, Shimomura (1997) has introduced slightly
modifications on the Zhou bargaining set that essentially imply three differences: firstly,
that the grand coalition of all players forms; secondly, that players only will collaborate in
objections and counterobjections if strictly higher payoffs are implemented; and, finally,
that the final payoff should be individually rational. The first and third requirements
make easier the comparison with other bargaining sets; the second one points out that
individual incentives are important. The present paper analyzes this modification of the
Zhou bargaining set and a similar one for the Mas-Colell bargaining set, also introduced
by Shimomura, where the above three requirements are imposed.
We provide a necessary condition to check the coincidence between the core and the
Shimomura’s bargaining sets. This condition is based on the so-called max-payoff vec-
tors. These vectors assign, following an a priori ordering, a minimum payoff to players
preserving some core constraints. The coincidence between the Shimomura’s bargaining
sets and the core of a game implies that all max-payoff vectors are core elements of the
game, that is, all core constraints must be satisfied.
In Section 2 some preliminary definitions and notations are given. In Section 3 we
introduce and illustrate the computation of the max-payoff vectors and we state the main
result of the paper. Section 4 concludes by analyzing the case of assignment games.
2 Notations and definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of players. For all coalition S ⊆ N , |S| denotes the number
of players in S. A cooperative game with player set N is a function v : 2N → R assigning
to each coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S) such that v(∅) := 0. The function v is called
the characteristic function of the game and v(S) is the worth of the coalition S. Let GN
be the class of cooperative games with transferable utility and player set N .
A game v ∈ GN is monotonic if for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N , v(S) ≤ v(T ). The monotonic cover
of a game v ∈ GN is the game vˆ ∈ GN defined as vˆ(S) := maxR⊆S{v(R)}. By definition,
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the monotonic cover is a monotonic game.
Let RN stand for the real space of vectors x = (xi)i∈N where xi is interpreted as the
payoff to player i ∈ N , xS is the restriction of x to the members of S and x(S) denotes∑
i∈S xi, with the convention x(∅) = 0. The set of preimputations of a game v ∈ GN is
defined by I∗(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)}. The set of imputations of v is defined by
I(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N} and its core is defined
by C(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}. A game with
a non-empty core is called a balanced game. Let BN ⊆ GN be the subclass of balanced
games with player set N . Given a game v, a preimputation x ∈ I∗(v) and a pair of players
i and j, the maximum surplus of i against j at x is defined as
svij(x) = max{v(S)− x(S)|S ⊆ N, i ∈ S, j 6∈ S}.
We say that player i outweighs player j at x if svij(x) > s
v
ji(x). The prekernel of a
game v (Davis and Maschler, 1965), PK(v), is always non-empty and consists of those
preimputations x such that no player outweighs any other player at x. This is
PK(v) = {x ∈ I∗(v) | for all i, j ∈ N, svij(x) = svji(x)}.
As usual, the bargaining set is defined by means of an interaction of objections and
counterobjections. Shimomura (1997) considers modifications of both the Mas-Colell
bargaining set (1989) and Zhou bargaining set (1994). To define them, let v ∈ GN and
x ∈ I(v). Following Shimomura (1997), an objection to x is a pair (S, y), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
and y ∈ RS with y(S) = v(S) such that yi > xi, for all i ∈ S. Shimomura also qualifies
the original definitions of counterobjection: a counterobjection to an objection(S, y) a` la
Mas-Colell is now a pair (T, z), ∅ 6= T ⊆ N , z ∈ RT with z(T ) = v(T ) such that zi > yi,
for all i ∈ T ∩ S, and zi > xi, for all i ∈ T \ S; on the other hand, a counterobjection to
(S, y) a` la Zhou is a pair (T, z), where T \ S 6= ∅, S \ T 6= ∅, T ∩ S 6= ∅, and z ∈ RT
with z(T ) = v(T ) such that zi > yi, for all i ∈ T ∩ S, and zi > xi, for all i ∈ T \ S.
Note that the bargaining process starts with an imputation x and involves strictly higher
payoffs not only for all players involved in objections but also in counterobjections, and
these are the main changes with respect to the original definitions.
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Definition 1 The Mas-Colell bargaining set (a` la Shimomura) is defined as
MBSh(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | each objection to x can be countered a` la Mas-Colell}.
Definition 2 The Zhou bargaining set (a` la Shimomura) is defined as
ZSh(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | each objection to x can be countered a` la Zhou}.
If no confusion arises, we will refer to them simply as the Mas-Colell bargaining set
and the Zhou bargaining set. By definition, these sets only consist of imputations (indi-
vidually rational payoff vectors) and they always include the core. If the core is nonempty,
obviously these bargaining sets are non-empty. Moreover, the following chain of inclusions
holds: C(v) ⊆ ZSh(v) ⊆MBSh(v).
Shimomura also defines a subset of the Zhou bargaining set (the steady bargaining set,
SB(v)) by means of a domination binary relation between coalitions. He shows that the
steady bargaining set can be rewritten as
SB(v) :=
x ∈ I(v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
for all S ⊆ N with v(S)− x(S) > 0,
there exists T ⊆ N : S ∩ T 6= ∅, S \ T 6= ∅,
T \ S 6= ∅ and v(T )− x(T ) ≥ v(S)− x(S)
 (1)
and he also proves that SB(v) ⊆ ZSh(v). This subsolution of the Zhou bargaining set
will be useful to prove our results, since some imputations will be known to belong to the
bargaining set by checking their inclusion in the steady bargaining set.
3 A necessary condition for the coincidence
We start by analyzing a game with four players. The characteristic function is defined by
v({i}) = 0, for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and v(S) = |S|, for all S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2. It is easy to
check that the core of the game consists of a unique point: C(v) = {(1, 1, 1, 1)}. Now, let
us suppose players are ordered exogenously – for instance, take the ordering θ = (2, 3, 1, 4)
– and let us assign a payoff to each player as follows. Give the first player, player 2, her
individual worth:
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xθ2 = v({2}) = 0.
Then, the second player in the ordering, player 3, takes the maximum payoff of either
staying alone or joining player 2, forming the coalition {2, 3}, and obtaining the worth of
the coalition minus the payoff xθ2 assigned to player 2 previously; hence,
xθ3 = max{v({3}), v({2, 3})− xθ2)} = 2.
Player 1 comes in third place and also chooses among staying alone or joining a subset
S (not necessarily all) of his predecessors and obtaining what is left from the worth of
this coalition S after paying xθi to each predecessor i in S. This is,
xθ1 = max{v({1}), v({1, 2})− xθ2, v({1, 3})− xθ3, v({1, 2, 3})− xθ2 − xθ3} = 2.
Finally, the last player is just given what is left to reach efficiency, this is
xθ4 = v(N)− xθ1 − xθ2 − xθ3 = 0.
Thus, the payoff vector obtained is xθ(v) = (2, 0, 2, 0). Notice xθ(v) is not in the core
of the game since xθ2 + x
θ
4 = 0 < v({2, 4}). The claim we prove in the paper is that the
Shimomura’s bargaining sets of a game do not coincide with its core since at least one
max-payoff vector relative to some ordering does not belong to the core. To this end we
define several notions.
Let v ∈ GN and let θ be an ordering of players in N , that is a bijection θ : {1, . . . , n} →
N where θ(k) = ik ∈ N ; we denote it by θ = (i1, . . . , in) and by ΘN the set of all such
orderings. Furthermore, given θ = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ ΘN , let us define the set of predecessors
of a player ik by P
θ
ik
:= {i1, . . . , ik−1}, for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, while P θi1 := ∅. The set of
followers of a player ik is defined by F
θ
ik
:= {ik, . . . , in}, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We say that x ∈ RN lexicographically precedes y ∈ RN with respect to θ, x ≺θ` y,
if either xi1 < yi1 or there exists k ∈ {2, . . . , n} such that xik < yik and xir = yir , for
all r ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. The lexmin solution over the core of a balanced game v relative
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to θ ∈ ΘN is defined as the (unique) payoff vector `θ(v) ∈ C(v) that lexicographically
precedes any other vector in the core of the game v, i.e. `θ(v) ≺θ` x for all x ∈ C(v),
x 6= `θ(v).
A formula to compute the lexmin solution of an arbitrary game is not available for
the general case. Nevertheless, we can define a recursive formula to obtain a payoff vector
(we call it the max-payoff vector) such that, whenever it is in the core, it coincides with
the lexmin solution.
The max-payoff vector xθ(v) ∈ RN of v relative to θ is defined by
xθik := maxQ⊆P θik
{v({ik} ∪Q)− xθ(Q)}, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, and
xθin := v(N)− xθ(N \ {in}).
The relationship between the lexmin and the max-payoff vectors is summarized in the
next proposition.
Proposition 1 Let v ∈ BN and θ ∈ ΘN . Then
xθ(v) ∈ C(v)⇔ `θ(v) = xθ(v).
Proof We only need to prove the only if part. Suppose the vectors xθ(v) and `θ(v) are not
equal, where θ = (i1, . . . , in). Comparing x
θ(v) and `θ(v), and following the ordering θ,
let player ik be the first player with different payoffs. That is, x
θ
i1
= `θi1 , . . . , x
θ
ik−1 = `
θ
ik−1
and xθik 6= `θik ; notice k 6= n. If xθik < `θik then xθ(v) ≺θ` `θ(v) but this contradicts
the definition of the lexmin solution. If xθik > `
θ
ik
, by definition of max-payoff vector
`θik < x
θ
ik
= maxQ⊆P θik
{v({ik}∪Q)−xθ(Q)} = v({ik}∪Q∗)−xθ(Q∗) = v({ik}∪Q∗)−`θ(Q∗)
for some Q∗ ⊆ P θik . Hence, `θ({ik} ∪ Q∗) < v({ik} ∪ Q∗) which contradicts `θ(v) to be a
core element. 2
The coincidence between the lexmin and the max-payoff vector is in fact a necessary
condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets and the core.
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Theorem 1 For any arbitrary balanced game v ∈ BN we have:
1. If C(v) = ZSh(v), then xθ(v) ∈ C(v), for all θ ∈ ΘN
2. If C(v) =MBSh(v), then xθ(v) ∈ C(v), for all θ ∈ ΘN .
Proof Let us first prove item 1. For |N | ≤ 2 the result is trivial. For |N | ≥ 3, let us
suppose we have C(v) = ZSh(v) and there exists an ordering θ = (i1, i2, . . . , in) ∈ ΘN
such that xθ(v) 6∈ C(v) or equivalently, by Proposition 1, `θ(v) 6= xθ(v). Therefore, there
exists k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} such that `θik 6= xθik and, for all ir ∈ P θik , `θir(v) = xθir(v). In
fact, `θik 6= xθik implies `θik > xθik , since `θ(v) belongs to C(v).
We first claim that k 6= n − 1. To check this, let us suppose k = n − 1 and so
`θin−1 6= xθin−1 and `θir = xθir , for all r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 2}. In fact, we have `θin−1 > xθin−1 .
Hence, define x ∈ RN as xir := `θir , for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, xin−1 := `θin−1 − ε and
xin := `
θ
in + ε, where 0 < ε < `
θ
in−1 − xθin−1 . It is easy to check that x ∈ C(v) and
x ≺θ` `θ(v) which is a contradiction. Therefore, k ≤ n− 2.
Now, take ε ∈ R such that
0 < ε < min

`θik − xθik , min
S⊆N :ik∈S
`θ(S)−v(S)>0
{`θ(S)− v(S)}

and define the payoff vector α ∈ RN as αik := `θik − ε and αi := `θi , if i ∈ N \ {ik}. Let
us remark that α(N) = v(N) − ε < v(N). Furthermore, let us define the excess game
(F θik+1 , eα) as follows,
eα(∅) := 0,
eα(R) := max
Q⊆P θik+1
{0, v(R ∪Q)− α(R ∪Q)}, for all ∅ 6= R ⊆ F θik+1 ,
and consider its monotonic cover (F θik+1 , eˆα). Notice
eˆα(R) ∈ {0, ε}, for all R ⊆ F θik+1 . (2)
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To see this, recall that eˆα(R) = v(R
′ ∪Q)− α(R′ ∪Q), for some R′ ⊆ R and Q ⊆ P θik+1 .
If ik 6∈ Q then v(R′ ∪ Q) − α(R′ ∪ Q) = v(R′ ∪ Q) − `θ(R′ ∪ Q) ≤ 0. If ik ∈ Q and
v(R′ ∪Q)− `θ(R′ ∪Q) < 0 then, by definition of ε, v(R′ ∪Q)− α(R′ ∪Q) < 0. Finally,
if ik ∈ Q and v(R′ ∪ Q) − `θ(R′ ∪ Q) = 0 then v(R′ ∪ Q) − α(R′ ∪ Q) = ε. Moreover, it
holds that eˆα(F
θ
ik+1
) = v(N) − α(N) = ε, just taking Q = P θik+1 in its definition. Hence,
let us define
W := {R ⊆ F θik+1 | eˆα(R) = ε and eˆα(R′) = 0 for all R′  R}.
Notice, since (F θik+1 , eˆα) is a monotonic game, eˆα(R∪{i})− eˆα(R) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ F θik+1
and R ⊆ F θik+1 \ {i}. Now, choose an element of the prekernel of this game, let us
say δ ∈ PK(eˆα). By Theorem 5.6.1. in Peleg and Su¨dholter (2007) we know that,
for all player i ∈ F θik+1 and for all element in the prekernel of (F θik+1 , eˆα), his payoff is
bounded below by mi(eˆα) = min
S⊆F θik+1\{i}
{eˆα(S ∪ {i}) − eˆα(S)} and bounded above by
Mi(eˆα) = max
S⊆F θik+1\{i}
{eˆα(S ∪ {i})− eˆα(S)}. Therefore, for all δ ∈ PK(eˆα),
0 ≤ mi(eˆα) ≤ δi ≤Mi(eˆα) ≤ ε, for all i ∈ F θik+1 .
It is easy to check that eˆα(M ∪ {i}) − eˆα(M) = 0, for all i ∈ F θik+1 \
⋃
R∈W R and all
M ⊆ F θik+1 \{i}. To prove it, if eˆα(M) = ε, by monotonicity of the game (F θik+1 , eˆα), we get
eˆα(M ∪ {i}) = ε. If eˆα(M) = 0, then R 6⊆M , for all R ∈ W . But then eˆα(M ∪ {i}) = 0,
since otherwise M ′∪{i} ∈ W , for some M ′ ⊆M , and this contradicts i ∈ F θik+1 \
⋃
R∈W R.
As a consequence,
δi = 0, for all i ∈ F θik+1 \
⋃
R∈W
R. (3)
Now, define the payoff-vector x ∈ RN as xir = αir = `θir , for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},
xik = αik = `
θ
ik
−ε and xir = αir +δir = `θir +δir , r ∈ {k+1, . . . , n}. It holds x(N) = v(N)
and xi ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N . However, x 6∈ C(v) since otherwise x ≺θ` `θ(v) as xir = `θir
for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and xik < `θik . We want to prove that x ∈ ZSh(v), and in the
first place we prove some basic properties of x:
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(a) If S ⊆ N is such that v(S) − x(S) > 0, then ik ∈ S. Otherwise, v(S) − x(S) =
v(S) − `θ(S) − δ(S ∩ F θik+1) ≤ v(S) − `θ(S) ≤ 0, where the last inequality follows
from, `θ(v) ∈ C(v).
(b) If S ⊆ N and v(S) − x(S) > 0, then S ∩ F θik+1 6= ∅. Otherwise, by (a), x(S) =
`θik − ε+x(S \ {ik}) > xθik +xθ(S \ {ik}) = xθ(S) ≥ v(S), where the strict inequality
follows from the definition of ε and the last inequality by the definition of xθ(v).
(c) If S ⊆ N and v(S) − x(S) > 0, then eˆα(S ∩ F θik+1) = ε. Otherwise, by (2),
eˆα(S ∩F θik+1) = 0 and so 0 < v(S)−x(S) ≤ v(S)−α(S) ≤ eˆα(S ∩F θik+1) = 0, where
the second inequality holds since x ≥ α and the third one just by definition of the
monotonic cover of eα.
Let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition with positive excess, i.e. v(S) − x(S) > 0. By
property (b), S ∩ F θik+1 6= ∅. Let us take now RS ∈ W such that
δ(RS \ (S ∩ F θik+1)) 6= 0. (4)
Such a coalition RS exists, since otherwise δr = 0 for all r ∈ R\(S∩F θik+1) and all R ∈ W ,
and so δ(
⋃
R∈W(R \ (S ∩ F θik+1))) = δ(
⋃
R∈W R \ (S ∩ F θik+1)) = 0. But then
ε = δ(
⋃
R∈W R) = δ((
⋃
R∈W R) \ (S ∩ F θik+1)) + δ((
⋃
R∈W R) ∩ (S ∩ F θik+1))
= δ((
⋃
R∈W R) ∩ (S ∩ F θik+1)) ≤ δ(S ∩ F θik+1) ≤ ε,
where the first equality follows from (3) and the last inequality follows from δi ≥ 0,
for all i ∈ F θik+1 , and δ(F θik+1) = ε. Therefore, we conclude δ(S ∩ F θik+1) = ε, but then
v(S) − x(S) = v(S) − α(S) − δ(S ∩ F θik+1) = v(S) − `θ(S) + ε − ε = v(S) − `θ(S) ≤ 0,
contradicting S to be a coalition with strictly positive excess with respect to v at x.
Now, let us choose a coalition S ′ ∈ W , S ′ ⊆ S ∩ F θik+1 , with the largest excess at δ ,
i.e.
eˆα(S
′)− δ(S ′) ≥ eˆα(S ′′)− δ(S ′′), (5)
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for all S ′′ ∈ W with S ′′ ⊆ S ∩ F θik+1 . Notice that the existence of S ′ is guaranteed by
property (c).
Since S ′ and RS are in W , S ′ \ RS 6= ∅ and RS \ S ′ 6= ∅. Taking into account
δ(RS \ (S ∩ F θik+1)) 6= 0, let us now select
i ∈ S ′ \RS and j ∈ RS \ (S ∩ F θik+1) such that δj > 0. (6)
Then, since eˆα(S ∩ F θik+1) = eˆα(S ′) = ε and δ(S ′) ≤ δ(S ∩ F θik+1), we have
0 < v(S)− x(S) = v(S)− α(S)− δ(S ∩ F θik+1)
≤ eˆα(S ∩ F θik+1)− δ(S ∩ F θik+1)
≤ eˆα(S ′)− δ(S ′) ≤ seˆαij (δ) = seˆαji (δ)
= eˆα(R
′)− δ(R′),
(7)
where R′ ⊆ F θik+1 , j ∈ R′ but i 6∈ R′. As a consequence of (7) and δi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ F θik+1
we obtain eˆα(R
′) > 0 which implies
eˆα(R
′) = eα(R′′) = ε > 0, for some R′′ ⊆ R′. (8)
Notice that i 6∈ R′′, since i 6∈ R′ and R′′ ⊆ R′. Moreover, by (8),
eˆα(R
′)− δ(R′) = eα(R′′)− δ(R′)
= v(R′′ ∪Q′′)− α(R′′ ∪Q′′)− δ(R′),
(9)
for some Q′′ ⊆ P θik+1 .
If we set T = R′′ ∪Q′′ we obtain, by (7) and (9),
0 < v(S)− x(S) ≤ v(T )− α(T )− δ(R′) ≤ v(T )− α(T )− δ(R′′)
= v(T )− x(T ),
(10)
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where the last inequality follows from R′′ ⊆ R′ and δi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ F θik+1 . Moreover,
notice that i ∈ S \ T 6= ∅ since, by (6), i ∈ S ′ ⊆ S ∩ F θik+1 and i 6∈ R′′.
On the other hand, we claim T \ S 6= ∅. To check this, we first prove that R′′ \ (S ∩
F θik+1) 6= ∅. If j ∈ R′′, then the statement is proved since, by (6), j 6∈ S ∩ F θik+1 . Let us
suppose j 6∈ R′′ and R′′ \ (S ∩F θik+1) = ∅ and so R′′ ⊆ S ∩F θik+1 . By (7) and (9), we have
0 < eˆα(S
′)− δ(S ′) ≤ v(R′′ ∪Q′′)− α(R′′ ∪Q′′)− δ(R′)
< v(R′′ ∪Q′′)− α(R′′ ∪Q′′)− δ(R′′)
≤ eˆα(R′′)− δ(R′′),
where the second strict inequality follows from the fact that j ∈ R′, δj > 0 and we are
supposing j 6∈ R′′. But this contradicts (5). Hence, ∅ 6= R′′ \ (S ∩ F θik+1) ⊆ T \ S.
Finally, by property (a), S ∩ T 6= ∅ since v(S) − x(S) > 0 and v(T ) − x(T ) > 0.
Therefore, since S \ T 6= ∅, T \ S 6= ∅, S ∩ T 6= ∅ and (10) we have proved that x is in
the steady bargaining set and so in the Zhou bargaining set, x ∈ SB(v) ⊆ ZSh(v).
To sum up, x ∈ ZSh(v)\C(v) which involves a contradiction with the initial hypothesis.
The proof of item 2. is straightforward since C(v) ⊆ ZSh(v) ⊆MBSh(v). 2
The condition stated in the theorem is necessary for the coincidence of the core and
the bargaining sets, but not sufficient as we will see in the next final section.
4 An application to assignment games
We end the paper with an application of Theorem 1 to the case of assignment games
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972). Two-sided assignment games represent two-sided markets
(buyers and sellers) where each buyer-seller pair obtains a non-negative gain of trading.
Assuming that each agent of one side can only trade with one agent of the opposite side,
the problem at issue is firstly to find an optimal matching between buyers and sellers
such that the joint profit is maximized; and secondly to allocate this profit among agents
taking into account the joint optimal profit every submarket can obtain.
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For example, consider the following market of 3 buyers (players 1, 2 and 3) and 3
sellers (players 4, 5 and 6). Matrix A summarizes the gain of each pair of agents:
4 5 6
1
2
3
3 1 4
1 6 1
1 1 3
Notice the only optimal matching is located along the main diagonal: player 1 trades
with player 4, 2 trades with 5 and 3 trades with 6, with a total gain of a14+a25+a36 = 12.
A cooperative game (N,wA) can be associated by defining wA(N) = 12 and computing,
for every subcoalition of agents S ⊆ N , the profit of an optimal matching of the submarket
restricted to agents in S. Notice that wA(S) = 0, if S consists either only of buyers or
only of sellers, since no trade is possible in these cases. The reader may easily check, for
instance, that wA({2, 6}) = a26 = 1 and wA({1, 3, 6}) = a16 = 4.
Any efficient allocation (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) of the total profit wA(N) = 12, assigns
x1 + x4 = 3, x2 + x5 = 6 and x3 + x6 = 3. However, notice that if we want x to be in
the core of the assignment game wA, x6 ≤ 3, since x3 ≥ 0 and x3 + x6 = 3. But then,
if x6 ≤ 3, x1 ≥ 1 since players 1 and 6 can obtain a16 = 4. This remark is crucial since
any max-payoff vector associated to an ordering starting with player 1 will not be in the
core of the game. To check this, take θ = (i1, . . . , i6) ∈ ΘN such that i1 = 1 and notice
xθi1 = wA({1}) = 0 which is smaller than the minimum core payoff to player 1. Hence,
xθ(v) 6∈ C(v) and, by Theorem 1, C(v)  ZSh(v) ⊆MBSh(v).
Note that buyer 1 is optimally matched with seller 4, but the element a14 is not the
maximum of row 1; it is said this matrix is not dominant diagonal. On the contrary, a
matrix is dominant diagonal (see Solymosi and Raghavan, 2001) if, provided the optimal
matching is placed on the main diagonal, each of its elements is the maximum of the
corresponding row and column. They prove that all players achieve a zero payoff in the
core of the assignment game if and only if the corresponding matrix is dominant diagonal.
Hence, following the same reasoning as in the previous example, we can state a general
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result for the case of markets with the same number of buyers and sellers1:
if A ∈M+n is not dominant diagonal, then C(wA)  ZSh(wA).
On the other hand, if A is dominant diagonal the max-payoff vectors might be or not
core elements. But even in the case that all the max-payoffs vectors are in the core of
the game, this is not sufficient to guarantee the coincidence between the core and the
bargaining sets. To check this, consider the assignment game corresponding to the matrix
B:
3 4
1
2
1 1
1 1
.
The associated cooperative game corresponds to the 2×2 glove market game. It can be
checked that xθ(wB) ∈ C(wB), for all θ ∈ ΘN . However the core and the Zhou bargaining
set a` la Shimomura do not coincide. The core is C(wB) = {(α, α, 1−α, 1−α) | 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}
while the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets a` la Shimomura are(α, β, 1− α+β2 , 1− α+β2 )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ α ≤ 10 ≤ β ≤ 1
 ∪
(1− γ+δ2 , 1− γ+δ2 , γ, δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ γ ≤ 10 ≤ δ ≤ 1
 .
This example proves that the condition stated in Theorem 1 is just necessary but not
sufficient for the coincidence of the core and the Shimomura’s bargaining sets. Further-
more, let us remark that the Davis-Maschler bargaining set of an assignment game always
coincides with its core (see Solymosi, 1999), as this is the case of the above examples.
To end the paper, let us mention that Shapley and Shubik (1972) already point out in
their seminal paper some weaknesses of the concept of the core applied to an assignment
game and the necessity to explore the behavior of other solution concepts. This work is a
contribution to this task, but it remains open a complete description and interpretation
of the bargaining sets of Shimomura for this class of games.
1We denote by M+n the set of non-negative square matrices.
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